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TORTS-DAMAGES-PROCEDURE OF DISCOUNTING DAMAGE AWARDS TO
PRESENT VALUE ABANDONED UNDER FEDERAL LAW IN ORDER TO
ACCOUNT FOR THE EFFECT OF FUTURE INFLATION
Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (3d Cir. 1982)
On January 13, 1978, Howard Pfeifer sustained injuries while work-
ing as a barge landing helper for Jones 8c Laughlin Steel Corporation
(J & L).1 Pfeifer successfully maintained a negligence action against
J & L under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA), in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania. 2
* Editor's Note: As a matter of policy, the Villanova Law Review gen-
erally treats decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in a single annual Third Circuit Review issue. This note is being
published separately in view of the fact that the United States Supreme Court
as granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit's decision on the issues of
(1) whether the lower court erred in ruling that Pfeifer had a valid cause of
action against his employer under § 905(b) of LHWCA; and (2) whether
lower courts erred in applying the law of Pennsylvania, specifically the case of
Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, to a case filed under a federal statute, in determining
the proper measure of damages.
1. Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 455 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982). Pfeifer slipped on ice that had
accumulated on a coal barge, fell into a rail, and landed on his tailbone. Id.
A heavy electric motor he had been carrying fell into his lap. Id. Although
Pfeifer underwent extensive physical therapy following the accident, he was
unable to return to work and began collecting benefits under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-
950 (1976). 678 F.2d at 455. The relevant portion of the LHWCA provides
that an employee covered by the Act shall receive compensation for injury
or death during employment upon the navigable waters of the United States,
including piers and loading terminals. See 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1978).
2. 678 F.2d at 455. Section 905(b) of the LHWCA authorizes third party
negligence actions: "In the event of injury to a person covered under this chap-
ter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone other-
wise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action
against such vessel as a third party." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). The district
court held that as a vessel owner pro hac vice, J & L was liable for negligence
under § 905(b). 678 F.2d at 455. Pro hac vice status arises when the actual
owner of a vessel gives entire possession and control of it to another, as by
charter. Aird v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 169 F.2d 606, 609-10 (3d Cir. 1948).
See also Blair v. United States Steel Corp., 444 F.2d 1390, 1391 (3d Cir. 1971)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972). The owner pro hac vice is
held to stand in the place of the legal owner, bearing the latter's responsibilities
for the voyage contemplated. Id.
J & L contended that Pfeifer did not have a cause of action under
LHWCA. 678 F.2d at 456. J 9- L cited § 905(a) of LHWCA, which provides
that payment of compensation under the Act is an employer's exclusive lia-
bility, and argued that § 905(a) was a total bar to a negligence action against
an employer, even one deemed an owner pro hac vice of the vessel. Id.
In finding liability under the LHWCA, the district court relied on recent
Third Circuit decisions. Id. at 455. See Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
(253)
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Since the district court found that Pfeifer was completely disabled
for a time as a result of the accident, and that he would permanently
suffer from a partial disability,3 the court awarded him damages which
included future lost wages. 4 The district court refused to discount the
award of future compensation to present value.5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 6 affirmed
the judgment of the district court, holding that the "total offset
method", in which the factor used to discount damages for future losses
to present value is presumed equal to and offset by the rate of future
inflation, was properly applied as the federal rule of damages. Pfeifer v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982).
The theory of compensatory damages requires that an injured plain-
tiff who has established liability receive an amount of money sufficient
to return him to the position he would have occupied had he not been
injured.7 Because the plaintiff has only one cause of action for his
injury, he is entitled to recover not only the losses he has suffered up to
Corp., 610 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 965 (1981), reinstated
on remand, 657 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3802 (1982)
(liability of employer under LHWCA depends on determination of pro hac
vice status); Blair v. United States Steel Corp., 444 F.2d 1390 (3d Cir. 1971)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972) (bailee with explicit possession
and control of barge is liable as owner pro hac vice for injuries to stevedore).
See also Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963) (exclusiveness of employer's
liability provision does not bar suit against an owner pro hac vice who is also
an employer liable for compensation).
3. 678 F.2d at 455. The district court found that J & L was negligent
and that its negligence was the proximate cause of Pfeifer's injury. Id. It
was determined that Pfeifer was completely disabled from the date of the
accident until July 1, 1979, and that thereafter he was capable of only "light
work" and could not return to his work on the river. Id. As of the date the
trial commenced, J & L had not offered Pfeifer a light-duty position. Id.
4. Id. In calculating Pfeifer's future lost wages, the district court multi-
plied Pfeifer's 1978 annual wage by his work life expectancy. Id. From this
figure the court deducted his projected earnings from light work (calculated
at the federal minimum wage level) from June 1, 1979 until Pfeifer's 65th
birthday and also deducted the amount already received under LHWCA.
Id.
5. Id. In declining to consider future wage increases or to discount the
award to present value, the district court adopted the position of a recent
Pennsylvania decision. See Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d
1027 (1980). In Kaczkowski, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the
total offset measure of calculating future losses. 491 Pa. at 579, 421 A.2d at
1039. For a discussion of Kaczkowski and the total offset method, see notes
43-46 & 54-68 and accompanying text infra.
6. The case was heard by judges Aldisert, Van Dusen, and Garth. Judge
Aldisert wrote the opinion of the court.
7. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1301 (1956);
Henderson, Some Recent Decisions on Damages: With Special Reference to
Questions of Inflation and Income Taxes, 40 INS. COUNS. J. 423, 423 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Henderson, Recent Decisions]. The converse principle is
that "the defendant must not be held responsible for losses which the plaintiff
has not, or will not, suffer as a result of the damage incurred." Id.
[VOL. 28: p.'253
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the time of trial, but also such items as medical expenses and loss of
earnings to be incurred in the future.8 It is customary for a plaintiff
who has been disabled to prove the amount of his lost future wages by
actuarial calculations as to his work-life expectancy and by expert testi-
mony as to any "merit" wage increases he would have received had he
been able to continue working in his prior job.9
Under the traditional rule, damages for losses to be incurred in the
future are not paid in their full amount.' 0 Because the plaintiff receives
payment now for damages incurred in the future, the award is adjusted
downward to reflect the interest which could be earned by investment
during the intervening years." In 1916, this was established as the
federal law of damages in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Kelly 12 where
the United States Supreme Court held that damage awards for future
losses must be discounted to their present value.'8 The Court reasoned
that, in order to avoid overcompensating the plaintiff, "adequate allow-
8. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES (1935) § 86, at
299. Allowing compensation for future losses for which there is a reason-
able basis for estimation has been rationalized by one commentator as follows:
"[P]laintiff is entitled to any and all damages necessary to make him whole;
his past is the measure of that wholeness and from it, the court must de-
termine also his rightful expectations for the future." Henderson, Recent De-
cisions, supra note 7, at 423.
9. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 300, 302. In estimating the loss
of future earnings, the jury is not limited to consideration of the wages which
the plaintiff was earning at the time of his injury, since the attempt is to
value future capacities: "The law recognizes the possibilities open to ambi-
tion." Id. at 300.
Pfeifer was concerned with compensating for the effects of future infla-
tion on loss of future earnings. However, it must be noted that wages also
increase over time as a result of "merit" pay raises. Comment, Future In-
flation, Prospective Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63 VA. L. REV. 105,
107 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Future Inflation]. Professor Hender-
son describes three factors which contribute to merit wage increases: (1) edu-
cation, (2) age, and (3) productivity. Henderson, The Consideration of
Increased Productivity and the Discounting of Future Earnings to Present
Value, 20 S.D.L. REv. 307, 312 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, In-
creased Productivity]. See also Peck and Hopkins, Economics & Impaired
Earning Capacity in Personal Injury Cases, 44 WASH. L. REV. 351, 356 (1969).
The distinction between merit wage increases and inflationary increases is
significant in that the indicators considered in determining the rate of future
inflation differ from those variables which control merit wage increases.
Comment, Future Inflation, supra, at 107.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 913A (1979). The Restatement
indicates that
If damages are awarded for losses that will be incurred in the future,
it would be overcompensation to give at the present time in cash their
full amount. They should be reduced to their present worth, since
they are being paid in advance.
Id. comment (a). For further discussion of the discount-to-present-value
procedure, see notes 11-15 and accompanying text infra.
11. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 8, § 86, at 304.
12. 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
13. Id. at 491. The Kelly Court stated that, "It is self-evident that a
given sum of money in hand is worth more than the like sum of money pay.
able in the future." Id. at 489. To avoid overcompensating the plaintiff by
1982-83]
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ance [must] be made.., for the earning power of money." 14
While it has long been recognized that future interest-earning
would enhance the value of a lump-sum damage award,'5 courts tradi-
tionally have refused to consider that future inflation may reduce the
purchasing power of that award over time.16 These courts felt that any
prediction of inflationary trends was mere speculation.' 7 This tradi-
tional view stemmed from disagreement among the experts as to the
rate and certainty of future inflation, dissatisfaction with the particular
evidence offered in individual cases, and a desire to avoid unnecessary
jury confusion.'$
In the years since the Kelly decision, persistent inflation "I has pro-
giving him the full value of his lost future earnings now, and enabling him
to increase that amount over his lifetime by investment, the lost wages are
discounted: "Ideally, an amount must be determined which, if invested at a
reasonable interest rate and assuming interest earnings and intermittent with-
drawals from capital, will yield over [plaintiff or] decedent's life expectancy
an amount equal to his net lifetime earnings." Dennis, Simon, & Drinkwater,
Wrongful-Death Damages-Fair Compensation for Future Pecuniary Loss Re-
quires Consideration of Economic Trends and Income Tax Consequences, 47
Miss. L.J. 173, 194-95 (1973). See Fleming, The Impact of Inflation on Tort
Compensation, 26 AM. J. Comp'. L. 51, 65-70 (1971).
14. 241 U.S. at 491. The Kelly Court suggested that the trial court de-
rive the discount rate from the rate of interest on safe investments without
assuming any particular financial expertise on the investor's part. See id. at
490-91.
15. See notes 10-16 and accompanying text supra. As a general rule,
"The common law system provides a single lump sum judgment in the typical
accident case." 2 F. HARPER &c JAMES, supra note 7, § 25.2 at 1303. As an
alternative, the use of periodic payments of damages for future loss has been
advocated by some commentators to avoid many of the uncertainties inherent
in lump sum awards. See generally Elliget, The Periodic Payment of Judg-
ments, 46 INs. COUNS. J., 130 (1976); Henderson, Periodic Payments of Bodily
Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A.J. 734 (1980).
16. See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 234 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 839 (1977); Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
464 F.2d 294, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1972); In re United States Steel Corp., 436
F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th Cir. 1970); Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804, 807
(lst Cir. 1970); Sleeman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 414 F.2d 305, 307-08 (6th
Cir. 1969); Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a/J'd
sub nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972). See generally 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 25.11, at 1323.
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir.
1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 839 (1977).
18. See Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 118. The Fifth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, took judicial notice of inflation in 1975. Johnson v.
Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 839 (1977). Although noting that the accelerating rate of inflation made
it likely that inflation would continue, the Johnson court found that it "[sitill
[could not] so surely discern the shadow of inflation as a coming event as to
warrant requiring its inclusion in a present rule for calculating future dam-
ages." 510 F.2d at 236. The Fifth Circuit was the last of the Courts of
Appeals to depart from the traditional view, but in September 1982, Johnson's
prohibition of any consideration of inflationary factors was overruled. Culver
v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 305 (en banc) (5th Cir. 1982). See also
note 25 infra.
19. The Consumer Price Index rose 185% from 1940-1972. Purchasing
Power of 'the Dollar: 1940-1978, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
[VOL. 28: p. 253
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yoked the concern of courts 20 and commentators.21  It is argued that an
erosion of the compensatory principle has occurred by discounting to
present value without also accounting for the effects of future inflation.2
This concern has precipitated a departure from the traditional approach
toward a recognition that future inflation is more certain than specula-
tive 23 Since future inflation estimates are not significantly more com-
ABSTRACr OF THE U.S.: 1978 (99th ed.). From 1969 to 1980, the Index rose
by 130%. See note 60 infra. See generally T. DERNBURG & C. McDOUGAL,
MACROECONoMICs, 287-96 (5th ed. 1976); D. NicHoLs & C. REYNOLDS, PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMICS, 180-87 (4th ed. 1973); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, 820-37 (1976);
Henderson, Recent Decisions, supra note 7, at 430; Henderson, Increased
Productivity, supra note 9, at 319; Solow, The Intelligent Citizen's Guide to
Inflation, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1975, at 58; Theory Deserts the Forecasters,
Bus. WK., June 29, 1974, at 50, 53.
20. See, e.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30,
37-38 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Steckler v. United
States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1375-78 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. English, 521
F.2d 63, 74 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Davis v. Hill Eng'g Corp., 549 F.2d 314,
332 n.24 (5th Cir. 1977); Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422,
436-39 (5th Cir. 1977) (Godbold, J., dissenting); Freeport Sulphur v. S.S. Her-
mosa, 526 F.2d 300, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1976) (Wisdom, J., specially concurring).
. The anomaly presented by application of the Kelly rule in inflationary
times was described by Judge Friendly. See McWeeney v. New York, N.H. &e
H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
In McWeeney, Judge Friendly stated that
[T]here are few who do not regard some degree of continuing inflation
as here to stay and who would be willing to translate their own earn-
ing power into a fixed annuity; and it is scarcely to be expected that
the average personal injury plaintiff will have the acumen to find
investments that are proof against both inflation and depression-
a task formidable for the most expert investor.
Id. (footnote omitted).
21. Commentators argue that changes in the economy require adjustment
of the Kelly rule. See, e.g., Comment, Future Inflation as an Element of
Damages in Alabama, 5 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 72, 85 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Inflation and Damages]. That commentator stated that
The theory behind the 'reduction to present value rule' assumes a
stable economy with stable prices . . . . This rule is a product of the
nineteenth century's theory of the earning power of money, which
modern economists now realize has been destroyed by rising prices
and incomes that reduce the purchasing power or value of money over
time.
Id. See also Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, 1970 EcoN. HANDBOOK 92.
See generally Fleming, supra note 13, at 61; Formuzis & O'Donnell, In-
flation and the Valuation of Future Economic Losses, 38 MONT. L. REV. 297
(1977); Peck and Hopkins, supra note 9 at 353. For a discussion of the
Kelly rule, see notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
22. See notes 20-21 supra. See also Henderson, Increased Productivity,
supra note 9, at 309. Henderson reasoned that the economic climate of the
latter part of the nineteenth century provided the rationale for the Kelly rule:
Between 1867 and 1896, for example, it is estimated the price level
dropped by about forty percent . . . . The economic lag of judicial
practice occurs . . . when courts continue to apply the rationale of
1916 to the economic realities of the 1970's.
Id. (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the Kelly rule, see notes 12-14 and accompanying text
supra.
23. Comment, Future Inflation as a Factor in the Determination of Dam-
ages, 12 U. TOL. L. REv. 369, 392 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
1982-83 ]-
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plex than other factors which go into the future damages calculation,
2 4
courts have taken the position that future inflation should in fairness
be considered.25 In the absence of a clear directive from the Supreme
Court,2 6 the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have developed a
variety of methods to account for- the effect of inflation as a matter of
federal damages law. 27
In Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co.,28 the Sixth Circuit
developed what has been labeled the "middle ground" approach to the
Inflation Factor]. See also Comment, Inflation and Damages, supra note 21,
at 83.
24. For a discussion of the factors involved in the computation of dam-
ages for lost future earnings, see notes 9, 10, 13, 14, & 62 supra.
25. See Comment, inflation Factor, supra note 23, at 398-99. Recently,
the last Circuit Court of Appeals to adhere to the traditional view overruled
its prior decision. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982)
(en banc), overruling Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 839 (1977). The Fifth Circuit stated
in Culver that "parties should be allowed, in future earnings damages cases,
to present evidence . . . [of] the likely wage increases that would have been
obtained by the particular plaintiff in his occupation, whether these likely
increases are due to cost of living, promotions, merit raises, or productivity."
688 F.2d at 308 (footnote omitted). Johnson was overruled because it failed
to recognize that inflation had historically led to cost of living wage increases.
Id. at 305.
26. Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 111. While the Supreme
Court has not ruled upon the issue of inflation, the court has approved the
consideration of some anticipated wage increases in awarding lost future earn-
ings. Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968). One commentator
has suggested that Grunenthal has not been viewed as precedent for the con-
sideration of inflation since the Court failed to distinguish between inflation
and wage increases due to merit, and because Grunenthal was decided before
the Courts of Appeals squarely confronted the inflation issue. Comment,
Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 112. For a discussion of the distinction
between inflationary wage increases and wage increases due to merit, see note
9 supra.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that the effect of future
income taxes should be considered in computing damage awards. Norfolk W_
Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980). In Norfolk, the Court stated,
Admittedly, there are many variables that may affect the amount of a
wage earner's future income-tax liability . . . . But future employ-
ment itself, future health, future personal expenditures, future in-
terest rates and future inflation are also matters of estimate and
prediction.
Id. at 494 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Because courts had developed
effective methods for the consideration of expert testimony by modern juries
familiar with these economic phenomena, the Court felt that evidence of a
decedent's after tax earnings was not too speculative or complex. Id. The
Second Circuit has interpreted Grunenthal as "clearly indicating [the Court's)
approval of including inflation estimates in future wage loss awards." Doca
v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has referred to this same
language as "favorable dicta" on the consideration of inflation. See Byrd v.
Reederei, 638 F.2d 1300, 1308 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 688 F.2d 324
(1982).
27. Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 111.
28. 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974).
6
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inflation inquiry.29 The Bach court excluded the plaintiff's offer of ex-
pert testimony as to specific inflationary wage increases in future years 0,
but held it was error for the judge not to allow the jury to consider
future inflation as part of its "common experience." 81 The Bach court
reasoned that evidence of future dollar values was too speculative be-
,cause "the predictive abilities of economists have not advanced so far
that they can forecast with any certainty the existence and rate of in-
flation for the next thirty years." 32 On the other hand, the court felt
that instructing the jury not to consider future inflation might leave the
plaintiff "grievously under-compensated." 33
Other Courts of Appeals have admitted evidence of specific future
inflation rates on the theory that it is preferable to predict economic
trends as accurately as current knowledge permits, rather than to leave
the rate of inflation to the jury's speculation.34 These courts are de-
scribed as following the evidentiary approach, which encompasses at
least three distinct viewpoints as to how the inflation factor should be
incorporated into the damage calculation.35
For example, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. English,36
29. See Comment, Futture Inflation, supra note 9, at 113; Note, Consider-
ing Inflation in Calculating Lost Future Earnings, 118 WASHBURN L.J. 499
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Considering Inflation]. See also Frampton
& Weinstein, Determining Damage Awards: Some Theories and Assumptions,
Legal Intelligencer, June 29, 1982, 1, 14-15.
30. 502 F.2d at 1122. The court stated that "[l]imited use of economists
and other experts may be appropriate in some cases to show that raises in
income or promotions would most probably occur," without clarifying whether
it was referring simply to merit wage increases, on which evidence has tradi-
tionally been admitted, or to inflationary wage increases, evidence of which
was traditionally deemed speculative. Id. (citation omitted).
In the subsequent case of Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570
F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit held that it was error for the trial
court to exclude testimony on future age increases due to "either . . . infla-
tion or . . . any increase in earning capacity which might have occurred due
to [plaintiff's] developing skill and experience." Id. at 631. Because the
court spoke in general terms about future wage increases, it is unclear what
kind of testimony it would allow on the specific issue of future inflation. See
id. at 631-32. The distinction between inflationary wage increases and merit
wage increases is discussed in note 9 supra.
31. 502 F.2d at 1122. The court explained, "Inflation is . . . within
the common experience of all jurors. Admittedly . . . without expert testi-
mony, their calculations will be even more imprecise . . . . But if jurors
should be prohibited from applying their common knowledge of inflation in
reaching a verdict, the party entitled to recovery could be grievously under-
compensated." Id.
32. 502 F.2d at 1122.
33. Id. The court explained that "[i]f a jury is not permitted to con-
sider decreases in the purchasing power of money, appellant would be woe-
fully damaged if inflation should continue at its present or at any other sub-
stantial rate." Id.
34. See, e.g., United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75-76 (9th Cir. 1975);
Dennis, Sirmon, and Drinkwater, supra note 13, at 184; Frampton and Wein-
stein, supra note 29, at 14. Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 110.
35. Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 110.
36. 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975).
7
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adopted the "independent incorporation" method. 87 This method com-
pounds the projected loss of earnings for each year by the prospective
rate of inflation; then, this inflation-adjusted figure is discounted to
present value by the accepted interest rate, to arrive at the damage
award.88
The Second Circuit, in Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense,
S.A., 39 approved the "offset present value" alternative, in which the esti-
mated inflation rate is subtracted from the interest rate to arrive at the
"real" rate of interest, which is then used to discount the award to
present value.40 The Second Circuit has embraced this method because
37. See Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 111. In English,
the court was applying California law but it engaged in its own analysis of
the issue, noting that it "would also feel compelled to the same result [under
federal law] for policy considerations." 521 F.2d at 75. Acknowledging the
inherently speculative nature of evidence of future inflation rates, the court
nevertheless felt it could not ignore what was an economic reality. Id. Sub-
sequently, in Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1975),
a case arising under federal law, the Ninth Circuit held that inflation was
"implicitly included" in an expert's estimate of wage increases in the railroad
industry; hence, no error had occurred. Id. at 293. This raises the question
of what evidence of future inflation would be admissible distinct from evi-
dence of merit wage increases. This issue is discussed in notes 9 & 30 supra.
The Tenth Circuit adopted the English court's method of calculating the
effect of future inflation in Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.
1977), a case arising under state law. Steckler was treated as controlling as
to the inflation calculation in a subsequent case arising under federal law.
See De Weese v. United States, 576 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1978).
38. See Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 111. The inde-
pendent incorporation approach is favored by those who wish to give the
maximum degree of control over the award to the fact finder. One com-
mentator suggests that
Implicit in our law of damages is the rule that the measurement of
damages awarded to an injured party should be left to the discretion
of the litigant's peers. Only in protection of justice do we discard
the verdicts thus rendered. It is only fair that we disclose to the
trier of facts all pertinent considerations that should influence his
assessment.
Comment, Inflation and Damages, supra note 21, at 87. The commentators
who support this approach believe that "[j]uries understand the general con-
cept of inflation and will be able to reasonably evaluate the probative value
of economic evidence presented to them." Note, Future Inflation and the
Undercompensated Plaintiff, 4 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 370 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Undercompensated Plaintiff]. On the other hand, some com-
mentators criticize the independent incorporation approach because it requires
two calculations and because of the belief that the relationship or differential
between interest and inflation can be estimated with greater accuracy than
either of the rates individually. Frampton and Weinstein, supra note 29, at
15. The relationship between interest and inflation rates is discussed at note
41 infra.
39. 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
40. Id. at. 39-40. See generally- Frampton and Weinstein, supra note 29,
at 15; Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 111. See also Feldman v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp: 1271 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in pertinent
part, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975). In determining the real rate of interest
as a matter of state law, the Feldman court examined the 1974 Economic
Report of the President, taking judicial notice of relevant data. The court
then calculated "the real yields, with inflation factored out, of investments
[VOL. 28: p. 253
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"there is a fairly constant relationship between interest and inflation
rates, 4' so that it is more reasonable to make a prediction about the
relationship of both rates than about the level of interest rates alone." 42
made since 1940 at the rate of interest paid on various types of securities
issued by the federal government." 382 F. Supp. at 1293 (footnote omitted).
The Feldman court appended to its opinion tables comparing the annual
change in the Consumer Price Index with the annual rates of interest on
government bonds. Id. at 1306-12. The court concluded that sufficient evi-
dence supported the conclusion that a real rate of interest of 1.5% should be
used to discount the award for lost future earnings to present value. Id. at
1293. For a discussion of Feldman, see Note, Torts-Damages-Considertion
of Inflation in Calculating Lost Future Earnings, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 803
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Lost Future Earnings]; Note, Torts-Dam-
ages-Adjusting Future Earnings for Inflation, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 138 (1978).
41. See Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 128-31. The rela-
tionship between interest rates and inflation was first postulated by Irving
Fisher, who observed that when prices are expected to rise, the present interest
rate will rise to cover the expected rate of inflation. See Inflation: A Survey,
85 ECON. J. 741, 788 (1975) (citing Fisher, Appreciation and Interest, 11 AM.
ECON. A. PUBLICATION, Series Three, 331 (1896)). See also I. FISHER, THE
THEORY OF INTEREST 40 (1930). When inflation is expected, investments are
not made. Banks will not lend unless the interest they will earn will more
than cover the expected rate of inflation. See Carlson, Economic Analysis v.
Courtroom Controversy: The Present Value of Future Earnings, 62 A.B.A.J.
628, 630 (1976).
The interest rate (i.e. the "nominal" interest rate) can theoretically be
broken down into two components: The "real" rate of interest (representing
the actual earning power of money), and an inflationary factor (representing
the expected rate of inflation). Id. See also Comment, Future Inflation,
supra note 9, at 128-31. The relationship between the two rates stems from
the effect of expectations about rising or falling price levels upon interest
rates. One commentator notes that "i]f information were perfect, future in-
flation would be foreseen, and the nominal interest rate would adjust to
account for the anticipated depreciation of the dollar." Id. at 129.
.42. 634 F.2d at 37. After deciding that fair compensation required
that some allowance be made for future inflation, the Doca court reviewed
the methods used by other state and federal courts, stating, "we are not
prepared to require any one particular method by which inflation should be
taken into account." Id. at 39. The court found that a 2% discount rate
appeared to represent the real rate of interest (adjusted for inflation), relying
upon what it perceived as the consensus among commentators and also the
calculations in Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D.
Conn. 1974), aff'd in pertinent part, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975). For a dis-
cussion of Feldman, see note 40 supra. The court emphasized that it would
not require a 2% discount rate as a matter of law, stating that it would
allow the parties to offer evidence of a more appropriate rate. Id. at 40.
Hoping to minimize disputes over the rate, the Doca court noted that "we
simply suggest the 2% rate as one that would normally be fair for the parties
to agree upon, and we authorize district judges to use such a rate if the parties
elect not to offer any evidence on the subject of either inflation or present
value discount. Id.
While the Feldman court gave no indication that it would apply the
same adjusted discount rate it had calculated in all future cases, the Doca
court seemed impressed with the possibility of using the constant differential
between interest and inflation rates to arrive at an accurate and yet simple
rule, rather than requiring empirical evidence of the differential in each
case. The court felt it could avoid prediction of specific rates of future in-
flation by making the commonsense assumption, borne out by experience,
that "over the course of years, investors in long term bonds will demand
returns that reflect the prospects of future inflation." 634 F.2d at 38.
9
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Finally, two state courts have adopted the "total offset" measure,43
which conclusively presumes that any amount earned in the future on
money invested now will be negated by the effects of future inflation.
44
The Seventh Circuit recently considered the future inflation question for
the first time and indicated its approval of both the independent incorpora-
tion and offset present value measures. See O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co.,
677 F.2d 1194, 1197 (7th Cir. 1982). The court considered expert testimony
and acknowledged a constant relationship between interest and inflation rates.
See id. at 1199-1201. The court felt that both the independent incorporation
method and the offset present value method were accurate and that they
would yield the same result. Id. at 1200. Commentators, however, have
demonstrated that these two methods do not yield the same result even when
the same interest and inflation rates are used. See Frampton and Weinstein,
supra note 29, at 15; Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 111. In
overruling its previous "traditional" position, the Fifth Circuit specifically
indicated its approval of the independent incorporation and offset present
value methods but emphasized its view that no single methodology was re-
quired since it had found "several acceptable methods" to account for future
inflation. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982).
43. See Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980);
Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967). The Supreme Court of Alaska
in Beaulieu was the first court to apply the total offset method and held that
the rate of depreciation in dollar value approximately offset the financial
windfall otherwise attributable to a failure to discount to present value. Id.
at 671. The total offset, then, conclusively presumes that inflation will equal
and cancel out the interest rate. See Frampton and Weinstein, supra note 29,
at 15; Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 109.
No circuit court applied the total offset as a legal presumption prior to
Pfeifer. See, e.g., Taenzler v. Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1979)
(mentioning the possibility that a total offset measure would violate the man-
date of the Supreme Court in Kelly); United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63
(9th Cir. 1975) (expressly rejecting the total offset assumption); Sleeman v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 414 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding that the total
offset approach violated the discount to present value rule of Kelly).
Kelly's discount to present value requirement is still binding on federal
courts in cases arising under federal law. See Note, Undercompensated Plain-
tiff, supra note 38, at 367. Although no circuit court prior to Pfeifer adopted
the total offset approach, most commentators do not see Kelly as an obstacle
to adoption of the total offset, since that approach theoretically incorporates
the allowance for interest earning on the award by presuming equivalence to
the inflation rate. Id. at 366. Further, "[Kelly] stands more generally for the
principle that accurate and fair compensation requires consideration of future
influences on the real value of the dollar awards." Id.
44. Frampton and Weinstein, supra note 29, at 15; Comment, Future Infla-
tion, supra note 9, at 109. The total offset measure has been advocated by
some judges and commentators as a simple, self-adjusting calculation. See, e.g.,
Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 580-83, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980); Davis v.
Hill Eng'g Corp., 549 F.2d 314, 332 n.24 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., concur-
ring); Freeport Sulphur Co. v. S.S. Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 308-09 (5th Cir.
1976) (Wisdom, J., specially concurring);. Sherman, Projection of Economic
Losses: Inflation v. Present Value, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 723 (1981); Carlson,
supra note 41. Some advocates of the total offset method contend that both
inflationary and merit wage increases should be offset. See Beaulieu v. Elliot,
434 P.2d 665, 671-72 (Alaska 1967); Carlson, supra note 41; Sherman, supra
at 723. Others contend that the discount rate should offset only wage increases
resulting from a rise in the inflation rate. See Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491
Pa. 561, 565 n.5, 421 A.2d 1027, 1029 n.5 (1980). Since there is almost always
a positive real rate of interest, offsetting inflation and interest rates will over-
compensate the plaintiff to some extent. Comment, Future Inflation, supra
[VOL. 28: p. 253
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss1/9
1982-83] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS - 263
For example, in Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz45 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court adopted the total offset method, abandoning its prior position
that evidence of inflationary wage increases was too speculative. 46 The
Kaczkowski court ruled that the practice of discounting to present value
would be discontinued on the theory that future inflation could be
deemed equal to future interest rates as a matter of law.
4 7
note 9, at 131-32. Commentators feel this result is nevertheless justifiable
because attorney's fees must come out of the plaintiff's award and because they
feel that it is better to err in favor of the plaintiff than risk undercompensation.
Id. See also Frampton and Weinstein, supra note 29, at 15. Opponents of
this method criticize it as economically incorrect, since interest rates will always
exceed inflation in the long run. See id.
The total offset "approach certainly has the advantage of simplicity-neither
economic testimony nor complicated damage computations are required-but it
ignores the 'real interest rate', the historical differential between rates of interest
and inflation." Note, Lost Future Earnings, supra note 40, at 815. For a dis-
cussion of the relationship between interest rates and inflation, see note 35
supra.
45. 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980). The Kaczkowski court noted that
"future inflation rates and future interest rates do not exist in a vacuum." Id.
at 581, 421 A.2d at 1037 (citing Inflation: A Survey, 85 ECON. J. 741, 788 (1975)).
Economist W.E. Gibson explained this phenomenon as follows:
When inflation becomes expected, lenders expect the real value of their
principal and interest payments to be depreciated, and borrowers
expect to be able to repay loans with money for which less real value
must be sacrificed than before expectations changed. Thus at any level
of market interest rates the quantity of loans supplied decreases while
the quantity demanded increases. Both forces increase nominal interest
rates.
Gibson, Interest Rates and Inflationary Expectations: New Evidence, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 854-55 (1972). See also I. FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 43
(1930). For a discussion of the interest and inflation rates, see note 40 supra.
46. 491 Pa. at 579, 421 A.2d at 1038-39, overruling, Havens v. Tonner, 243
Pa. Super. 371, 365 A.2d 1271 (Super. Ct. 1976).
47. 491 Pa. at 579, 421 A.2d at 1038-39. For an example of the prior
Pennsylvania rule, see Havens v. Tonner, 243 Pa. Super. 371, 365 A.2d 1271
(Super. Ct. 1976) (refusing to consider evidence of inflation or merit wage
increases because these inquiries were speculative).
The Kaczkowski court held that merit wage increases could be separately
accounted for on the basis of proper evidence. 491 Pa. at 579, 421 A.2d 1038-39.
This holding differs from the Alaska rule in that Pennsylvania courts are di-
rected to evaluate evidence of merit wage increases aside from the use of an
inflation offset. Id. at 563 n.5, 421 A.2d 1029 n.5. The Pennsylvania court
explained, "In our analysis, we will isolate the inflation element from the
other three factors, collectively called 'merit' increases, which are consumed in
productivity. We recognize that merit increases are controlled by different
variables than the inflationary factor, and deserve separate treatment." Id.
The Kaczkowski court continued,
We cannot embrace the Alaska court's restrictive method of computing
productivity as a component of lost future earnings since the Alaska
court limits its inquiry to those step advances keyed to the length of
service. The Alaska court's refusal to consider the .possibility of merit
based increases, [sic] unfairly discriminates against tose victims whose
salary depends on their skills, experience, and value to their employer.
Id. at 580, 421 A.2d at 1037.
For a discussion of the distinction between inflationary and merit wage
increases, see notes 9, 30, 37 supra.
Two months after adopting the total offset method as a federal rule of
11
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Against this background, the Third Circuit confronted the issue of
the proper federal rule of damages for future wage losses.48 The court
prefaced its discussion by noting that it was not presented with the issue
of whether the district court had erred by applying Pennsylvania law,4 9
but rather, whether the trial court had erred in applying the total offset
measure, as articulated in Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz,50 as a matter of
federal law.51
The court's analysis began with its recognition of the need for a
uniform federal rule in cases arising under the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the federal courts.52 The court noted that in formulating
federal law, it is neither unusual nor jurisprudentially improper for a
federal court to borrow substantive state law and adopt it as federal
law.5 3
damages in Pfeifer, the Third Circuit was faced with the inflation issue in a
case controlled by Pennsylvania law. See Barnes v. United States, 685 F.2d 66
(3d Cir. 1982). Barnes involved a claim under the Swine Flu Act, and was
controlled by state law through the procedural requirements of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Id. at 67. The court rejected the claim that the total offset
rule of Kaczkowski was overcompensatory to the extent that it penalized the
defendant: "The Pennsylvania courts have decided that the goal of fair com-
pensation for future lost wages is best served by a rule which favors predictable
simplicity over mathematical exactitude. We cannot say that such a policy is
in any sense punitive." Id. at 70 (emphasis supplied by court).
48. 678 F.2d at 456. In addition to deciding the damage issue, the Third
Circuit held that Pfeifer had a cause of action under section 905(b) of LHWCA.
678 F.2d at 456. See Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), followed in
Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 38-44 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976) (exclusiveness of employer's liability provision,
§ 904(a), does not bar a suit against an owner pro hac vice who is also an
employer liable for compensation).
Another contention of error was the district court's use of the minimum
wage to figure prospective earnings instead of J & L's "light-duty" wage. This
argument was dismissed on the ground that this was a determination of fact
which was not "clearly erroneous", and so it would not be disturbed on appeal.
678 F.2d at 461. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 52; Krasnow v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298,
1302-03 (3d Cir. 1972).
49. 678 F.2d at 456-57..J & L contended that the district court had erred
by applying state law, rather than federal law. Id. at 456. The Third Circuit
found that J & L had not preserved this issue for review, since it did not
properly identify the alleged error to the trial court, a mandatory prerequisite
to argument on appeal. Id. at 456-57 & n.l. In addition, the Third Circuit
found that the district court had in fact treated the dispute as limited to the
federal law of damages, so the Third Circuit would review only the proper
federal damage rule. Id. at 456-57.
50. 671 F.2d at 455-56 (citing 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1981)). For a
discussion of Kaczkowski, see notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
51. 678 F.2d 457.
52. Id. The court stated that the Constitution requires that all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction be governed by uniform.federal law. Id.
(quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1977)). See U.S.
CONsT. art. III, § 2.
53. 678 F.2d at 457-58. The court opined that a federal court can resort
to a rule derived from any source, state, federal, or foreign, if its intrinsic
wisdom commends it to the case at hand. Id. at 458. However, once this is
done, the rule takes on a new life of its own and grows independently of the
[VOL.. 28: p. 253
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The Pfeifer court then examined the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Kaczkowski 54 to take future inflation into considera-
tion in calculating lost future earnings.55 The Pfeifer court noted that
the Pennsylvania court found inflation and productivity factors to be
capable of prediction by experts.56 The court next pointed to formid-
able state 57 and federal 58 precedent which indicated a favorable trend
toward the consideration of inflation in damage awards. The court
drew further support from two opinions written by Judge Friendly of
court which first gave it root. Id. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,
472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
54. 678 F.2d at 458-59. For a discussion of Kaczkowski, see notes 45-47 and
accompanying text supra. The court noted that prior to Kaczkowski, Pennsyl-
vania courts had declined to consider the effect of inflation, finding it specula-tive. 678 F.2d at 458 (citing Havens v. Tonner, 234 Pa. Super. 371, 365 A.2d
1271 (Super. Ct. 1976)). The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Havens felt that
"the erratic behavior of the economy over the past half dozen years, plagued
by war and other unusual circumstances, is not a sufficient demonstration that
inflation at any predictable rate will continue for another twenty years." 234
Pa. Super. at 378, 365 A.2d at 1273.
55. 678 F.2d at 458. judge Aldisert quoted extensively from the reasoning
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kaczkowski. Id. at 458-59. He observed
that the Kaczkowski court had held that to continue the practice of discounting
to present value without considering the effects of future inflation would "ignore
[their] responsibility to attempt to 'graduate the amount of the damage award
exactly to the extent of the loss.'" 491 Pa. at 571, 421 A.2d at 1032 (quoting
Forsyth v. Palmer, 14 Pa. 96, 97 (1850)). The Pfeifer court referred to
Kaczkowski as "a most persuasive opinion, replete with relevant and credible
economic data." 678 F.2d at 458.
56. 678 F.2d at 458 (quoting Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. at 572, 421
A.2d at 1032-33). The Third Circuit quoted the Pennsylvania court as follows:
"Indeed, to ignore economic realities and presume that there will be no changes
in an individual's future earnings because of such factors is further removed
from reality than any variance that may result from our efforts to predict these
factors." Id.
57. 678 F.2d at 459. The Pfeifer court referred to a 1921 Vermont Su-
preme Court case discussing the effects of the appreciation and depreciation of
money upon the compensatory goal of damages and indicating the need to
consider inflation in measuring damages. Id. (quoting Holloran v. New Eng-
land Telephone & Telegraph Co., 95 Vt. 273, 276, 115 A. 143, 144 (1921)). The
Holloran court referred to the compensatory goal of damages and observed
that
Necessarily, damages are to be expressed in terms of money - . .
As a medium of exchange, its value appreciates or depreciates accord-
ing to the rise and fall in commodity prices. So it is that, at least so
far as those elements of damages properly classed as pecuniary losses-
like loss of time, loss of earning power, expenses, and the like-are
concerned, it is proper for the jury to take into consideration the fact,
known to everybody, that the purchasing power of money is at present
seriously impaired.
Id.
58. 678 F.2d at 459-60. Because of the persistence of strong inflationary
pressures, federal courts have held that inflation should be considered in damage
awards for lost future wages. See, e.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense,
S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Steckler
v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1375-78 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
English, 521 F.2d 63, 72-76 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Freeport Sulphur v. S.S.
Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 308-11 (5th Cir. 1976) (Wisdom, J., specially concurring).
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the Second Circuit which recognized the effects of inflation and invited
reconsideration of the traditional doctrine.5 9 Finally, the Pfeifer court
took notice of the effect of inflation on judicial salaries.6 0 The court
concluded that the argument could no longer be made that inflation is a
temporary phenomenon, and that as a reality of modern economic life
it should be considered in calculating damages as long as this can be
done without resorting to speculation.0 1
The court next examined the general federal law of damages. 62
The Third Circuit noted that federal courts had allowed recovery for
such items as pain and suffering, inability to enjoy prior avocations,
and loss of future earnings, despite the lack of a precise measure for
these losses.0 3 The court reasoned that the goal of full compensation
59. 678 F.2d at 459 & n.6. See Yodice v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche
Stroomboot Maatschappij, 443 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1971). In Yodice, Judge Friendly
noted that "if inflation should continue at its present pace, courts may have to
reconsider the propriety of the long recognized charge with respect to discount."
443 F.2d at 79. Judge Aldisert opined that this reconsideration was not under-
taken in Yodice because of the absence of economic data on the record and the
relatively small loss of future earnings. 678 F.2d at 459. However, Judge
Aldisert stated that the time had arrived for the reconsideration invited in
Yodice. Id. See also McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34,
38 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960) (although Judge Friendly
stated there was little authority for having a jury consider inflation, he recog-
nized that continuing inflation is part of modern economic reality).
60. 678 F.2d at 460 (quoting The Report of the Commission on Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial Salaries (December 1980)). The court found the
quoted statistics especially persuasive:
" From 1969 to 1980, the Consumer Price Index rose by more than
130 percent.
" During the same period, the Hourly Earnings Index, which reflects
the wage rates in the private, non-farm economy, also rose by more
than 130 percent.
• The 1980 $57,500 salary for U.S. Circuit Judges amounted to $24,400
in terms of 1969 dollars at a reduction of 43 percent.
Id.
61. Id. Aldisert explained that because of "the extensive subsequent de-
velopment in the common law, the present economic certainty of continuing
inflation, and the careful presentation of the issue in an adversarial context"
in the case before it, the court felt that the time was ripe for taking a definite
position, and that "justice," "common sense," and "public policy" demanded
that it recognize inflation as a force to be reckoned with. Id. at 459 n.6, 460.
62. Id. at 460 (citing Downie v. United States Lines, 359 F.2d 344, 347-48
(3d Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 897 (1966)). In Downie the
court applied the general rule that a seaman injured by the tortious conduct
of his employer is entitled to an award of damages commensurate with the
nature and extent of his injuries. Id. The Pfeifer Court explained that this
required
reimbursement for his loss of earnings, past and prospective; for any
impairment of his earning capacity, medical expenses incurred and to
be incurred, and for any other economic loss he may have sustained or
is likely to sustain. In addition, he is also entitled to redress for his
physical injury, including the effects thereof, such as pain, suffering,
mental anguish, discomfort, and inconvenience.
Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 460-61. See, e.g., Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 289 F.2d 797 (2d
Cir. 1961) (recovery for loss of ability to engage in activities previously enjoyed);
14
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for loss of future earnings could not be realized without accounting for
"the realities of the consumer price index and the recent historical de-
cline of purchasing power." 64
Recognizing that "the speculative nature of predicting future in-
flationary trends" troubled the courts, the Third Circuit reasoned that
adoption of the total offset method would avoid the speculative aspect
of prediction of specific future inflation rates.M1 The Pfeifer court char-
acterized this method as "a very sensible accommodation" in that it
assumed "that in the long run the effects of future inflation and the
discount rate will co-vary significantly with the other." 66 The Third
Circuit also noted the practical virtues of the total offset method in that
complex economic data need not be introduced, verified, or examined. 7
The court also found that under this method a damage award is theo-
retically reduced to present value "because the inflation and discount
rates are legally presumed to be equal and cancel one another." 68
On May 20, 1982, a petition for rehearing of Pfeifer was denied. 9
Judges Adams and Hunter, who would have granted the petition,7 0 felt
that a rehearing en banc was warranted because the total offset rule
was not consistent with the methods adopted by other Courts of Ap-
peals 71 and because of the wide-ranging effects the rule would un-
Wiles v. New York, Chic. & St. L. R.R., 283 F.2d 328, 332 (3d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 900 (1960) (recovery for loss of future earnings and any per-
manent impairment of earning capacity).
64. 678 F.2d at 461. The court stated that "[t]hus if we recognize, as we
must, that the injured worker is entitled to reimbursement for his loss of future
earnings, an honest and accurate calculation must consider the stark reality of
inflationary conditions." Id. at 461.
65. Id. at 461. For a discussion of the total offset method, see notes 43-47
and accompanying text supra.
66. 678 F.2d at 461. This assumption involved an evaluative judgment.
Judge Aldisert admitted, but because of evidence that the inflation and discount
rates co-vary significantly, the court found this judgment "no better or worse
than the varying prognostications of expert witnesses." Id. (referring to au-
thorities cited in Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. at 581, 421 A.2d at 1037).
67. Id. In accounting for inflation by eliminating the discount calculation,
the court felt it would be advancing the goals of predictability and judicial
efficiency. Id. The Third Circuit also expressed the hope that simplification
of the calculations would increase the number of out of court settlements be-
cause the parties would be able to arrive at the amount of recoverable damages
with greater certainty. Id.
68. Id. The Third Circuit found the total offset complied with the
discount-to-present-value rule of Kelly by incorporating the discount rate into
the offset. Id. (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485
(1916)). In sum, the new method was consistent with prior case law, best
avoided speculative evidence, and addressed. the problem of future inflation
with a satisfactory degree of accuracy. Id.
69. 678 F.2d at 462.
70. 678 F.2d at 462. Judges Adams and Hunter joined in a statement by
Judge Adams. See note 75 infra.
71. 678 F.2d at 462. Judge Adams noted that other Courts of Appeals
have considered the problem of accounting for inflation in damage awards and
have arrived at different solutions from that reached in Pfeifer. Id. He re-
marked that the Second Circuit had ruled that damage awards should still be
1982-83]
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doubtedly have.7 2 Judge Adams suggested that the relationship between
inflation and interest rates, the basic premise of the total offset method,
had been cast in doubt by the drop in inflation unaccompanied by
reduced interest rates at the time of his writing.73
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's decision to compensate for
the effects of future inflation upon damage awards for lost future earn-
ings is a realistic approach, in step with the trend in state and federal
courts.7 4 The court has correctly recognized the anomaly in discounting
awards to present value without considering that inflation will reduce
the purchasing power of present-day dollar values over the work-life
expectancy of the plaintiff or decedent.75
However, it is submitted that the total offset approach is premised
upon an economic falsehood: that interest rates and inflation will always
equal each other.76 In fact, the interest rate will generally be higher
than the inflation rate.7 7 The significance of this discrepancy is that
discounted, but at an inflation-adjusted, "real" interest rate. Id. (citing Doca
v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1980)).
Furthermore, he pointed to a Fifth Circuit decision agreeing to reconsider the
proper treatment of inflation. Id. See Byrd v. Reederei, 638 F.2d 1300, reh.
granted, 650 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 688 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1982). For
a discussion of these cases, see notes 25 & 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
72. 678 F.2d at 462. Judge Adams opined that "the damages rule estab-
lished in this case . . .is likely to have considerable consequences for a great
many subsequent cases [and that] .. . the rule implicates interests and affects
parties in a wide range of litigation." Id.
73. Id. He stated that "[t]he presence at this time of very high interest
rates and substantially reduced inflation would suggest caution in adopting a
rule that appears to be premised on some immutable relationship between
interest and inflation." Id.
74. For a discussion of the trend in the Circuit Courts toward consideration
of inflation in damage awards for future losses, see notes 19-42 supra. Failure
to take account of inflation is merely a refusal to deal with economic reality.
See, e.g., Henderson, Increased Productivity, supra note 9, at 309. In view of
the dramatic effects of inflation upon the value of the award and the sufficiency
of proof of damages with "reasonable certainty" in other areas of damages law,
there is no room for the refusal to consider inflation because future trends in
the economy are "speculative."
75. See Henderson, Increased Productivity, supra note 9, at 309. The dis-
counting procedure was adopted in an attempt to bring the law of damages
into conformity with the economic reality of investments. It would be incon-
sistent to refuse to adjust the damage calculation where the increase in value
through interest earning is eliminated to a large extent by the countervailing
force of inflation. See id.
76. See Note, Considering Inflation, supra note 29, at 509. Since the goal
of discounting to present value is to avoid overcompensation through interest-
earning on the award, dispensing with the discounting procedure to offset the
effects of future inflation presumes that the rates are equal. For a discussion
of the theory behind discounting to present value, see notes 10-14 and accom-
panying text supra.
77. See notes 41-42 supra. Irving Fisher's analysis of' the relationship be-
tween interest rates and inflation, it will be recalled, leads to the conclusion
that there is a relatively constant "real" rate of interest component in the
interest rate, which represents the difference between the interest rate and: the
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the total offset approach will result in overcompensation; the plaintiff
will still earn some unaccounted for interest because the award is not
discounted.78
The overcompensation inherent in the total offset method 79 has
been justified by commentators on the grounds that there are other
factors, such as the attorney's contingency fee, which reduce the plain-
tiff's award.8 0  However, it is submitted that if these separate considera-
tions moved the court to adopt the total offset approach, the true
grounds of the decision should have been identified.
Although motivated by the worthy goals of predictability and judi-
cial efficiency, 8 ' the Third Circuit sacrificed a similarly efficient, but
more accurate, economic position: the offset present value method ap-
proved by the Second Circuit.8 2  This method correctly focuses on the
[the Fisher] theory views the nominal interest rate as composed of the
real interest rate plus an inflationary factor. The Fisher effect states
if prices were stable the nominal interest rate would equal the real
interest rate thus yielding a zero inflationary factor. Furthermore, as
prices rise in response to inflationary pressures, the nominal interest
rate rises proportionately, with the real interest rate remaining con-
stant. Evaluation of American price trends and prevailing interest
rates discloses the Fisher effect's validity.
Note, Considering Inflation, supra note 29, at 510 (footnotes omitted).
78.. See id., at 509. To say that there is a correlation between interest
rates and inflation is not to say they are equal. Id. Calling the rates equal
ignores the constant differential between nominal interest rates and inflation,
i.e., the real interest rate. See notes 41, 42 & 77 supra. Under the total offset
method, with the discounting procedure eliminated, a plaintiff who invests his
lump sum award will in effect realize an increase in value to the extent of the
real rate of interest on the award. See Note, Considering Inflation, supra note
29, at 509. This increment in the award is overcompensation to the plaintiff.
Id. Therefore, the relationship between interest rates and inflation does not
warrant doing away with the discounting procedure altogether. Id. See also
Note, Lost Future Earnings, supra note 40, at 815.
79. For a discussion of the total offset method, see notes 43-47 and accom-
panying text supra. It has been noted that there are two schools of thought
on the total offset method, those who would offset inflation and the interest
rate, and those who would offset all future wage increases, including merit wage
increases, against the interest rate. See id.
As the Third Circuit in Pfeifer did not deal with the issue of merit wage
increases, the admission of expert testimony on such increases has not been
foreclosed. See 678 F.2d at 460.
. 80. Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 131-32. Most commonly,
it is urged that the subtraction of the attorney's contingency fee from the
award should settle any concerns about overcompensation of the plaintiff. See
id.; Frampton & Weinstein, supra note 29, at 15. See generally note 44 supra.
81. See 678 F.2d at 461.
82. See Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 37-38(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). For a discussion of Doca
and the offset present value method, see notes 39-42 supra. As noted by
Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit, there are three policies at stake in de-
termining compensatory damages: Predictability, efficiency, and accuracy. Free-
port Sulphur v. S.S. Mermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 311 (5th Cir. 1976) (Wisdom,
., specially concurring). An attempt to further the first two of these policies
at the expense of accuracy is without merit. See Comment, Future Inflation,
supra note 9, at 116.
269-19o82-83]
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variance between the interest and inflation rates, which has been re-
ferred to as the real rate of interest. 83 By using the real rate of interest
to discount the award to present value, inflation is accounted for and
overcompensation is avoided.8 4 Further, the offset present vaue method
is almost as simple and predictable as the total offset method, since the
calculations can be based on a fixed real rate of interest.8 5
It is submitted that Pfeifer sets a clear precedent that inflation must
be considered in damage awards for future losses.8 6 It is also submitted
that the adoption of the total offset approach should result in relatively
larger dollar value awards, and accordingly, a greater number of out-of-
court settlements, because of increased economic vulnerability and the
newly created ability to estimate potential recoveries without the need
to consider complex assumptions about inflation and discount rates.8 7
In addition, litigation will be made less costly and time consuming be-
cause expert testimony on these issues will not be required.88
Moreover, Pfeifer demonstrates the uncertainty among the circuits
on the treatment of future inflation under federal law.8 9 It is submitted
that this uncertainty ought to provoke Supreme Court review of the
issue, which is required if there is to be a "uniform federal rule" of
damages.90
Tracy M. Blake
83. For a discussion of the relationship between inflation and interest
rates, see notes 41-42 and accompanying text, supra.
84. See Note, Lost Future Earnings, supra note 40, at 814-16.
85. See Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 40
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). The Doca court authorized
the use of a 2% discount rate without the need for evidence as to inflation
or interest rates. However, the parties may offer evidence of a more appropri-
ate rate. See id. For a discussion of the Doca opinion, see note 36 and.
accompanying text, supra.
86. See 678 F.2d at 461.
87. Id. See also Frampton & Weinstein, supra note 29, at 15.
88. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
89. See Comment, Future Inflation, supra note 9, at 111-13.
90. The positions of the courts of appeals include the traditional refusal to-
consider evidence of inflation at all and the combination and confusion of the
inflation calculation with allowance merit wage increases. Even among those
courts which recognize the need to consider the effects of inflation per se,
there is disagreement as to the proper calculation. See notes 16-23, 30 and.
accompanying text supra. See notes 17-47 and accompanying text supra.
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